This paper surveys the empirical literature examining bank privatization. We begin by documenting the extent of, theoretical rationale for, and measured performance of state-owned banks around the world, and then assess why many governments have chosen to privatize their often very large state owned banking sectors. The empirical evidence clearly shows that state owned banks are far less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest state banking sectors. On the other hand, there is little in the empirical record to suggest that privatization alone transforms the efficiency of divested banks, especially when these are only partially privatized. Privatization generally improves performance, but by far less than is typically observed in studies of non-financial industries. An increasingly common outcome of large-scale bank privatization programs is foreign ownership of many nations' banking sector, which evidence suggests is usually positive in an economic sense, but problematic politically. 
Why Has State Ownership of Commercial Banks Been So Prevalent Historically?
Economists have debated the relative merits of state versus private ownership for centuries.
There is an enormous theoretical and empirical literature on state versus private ownership of nonfinancial firms. This is surveyed in Megginson (2004) , Chapter 2. We focus here specifically on how this debate relates to state ownership of commercial banking, since this is arguably the most basic industry in a modern economy because of its central role in allocating capital and monitoring corporate borrowers.
Regardless of where they are located, how they are organized, or the structure of their ownership, banks tend to perform three basic functions in any economic system. First, they play a central role in the country's payments system and also serve as a clearinghouse for payments. Second, they transform claims issued by borrowers into other claims that depositors, creditors, or owners are willing to hold.
Third, banks provide a mechanism for evaluating, pricing and monitoring the credit granting function in an economy. Of course, the efficiency, safety, effectiveness and transparency of these functions varies widely across countries depending on, among other things, who owns the banks, how the credit-granting process is managed and to whom credit is granted, and the degree to which bank-issued claims are held with some confidence by the non-bank public. In the context of a country with a long history of state ownership of commercial banks-or even significant state influence over commercial banking-these 3 efficiency, safety, and transparency concerns are often infinitely more complex and intractable than is more laissez-faire economies.
The Theoretical Case for State Ownership of Banks
During the modern era, proponents of state ownership have justified government control of business in three principal ways. First, public ownership has been justified as a way to ensure that business enterprises balance social and economic objectives, rather than focusing exclusively on profit maximization. Second, state ownership has been motivated as a response to significant market failuresparticularly the challenges posed to economic efficiency by natural monopolies-and as a method to internalize production externalities such as pollution. Third, proponents assert that public ownership can be justified under certain conditions involving informational asymmetries between principal (the public) and agent (the producer), where complete contracts cannot be written and enforced. Underlying all three cases is the assumption that governments can and do act benevolently, and thus that state ownership is economically efficient. Certainly, state ownership has also been imposed many times in history by ascendant political parties specifically in order to redistribute wealth and income from less to more "deserving" members of society, but this exercise in raw political power is usually justified by dogma, rather than by serious economic theory.
State ownership of banking both grew from the broader trend towards state ownership and was driven by specific factors. "Benevolent" reasons include a perceived lack of private capital with sufficient risk tolerance to finance growth; inadequate funding to sectors and groups with low financial but high social returns; a desire to promote industrialization and development at a pace more rapid than private financing would allow; and a desire to maintain domestic control over a nation's financial system. Less attractive, but equally compelling reasons include ideology (punishing capitalists), a desire to disenfranchise politically unpopular groups (postwar France's perception that main banks collaborated with Nazi occupiers); a reaction to foreign dominance for newly independent former colonies and a desire to use banks as tools for political patronage and advantage.
The Extent of State Ownership in Practice
There can be little doubt that state ownership of banking has proven popular historically. Table 1 shows the extent of government ownership as of the year 1999. This table uses 1999 data, presented in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) , but organizes the countries listed by their commercial legal system, as suggested by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2002 This is hardly surprising, since banks were central tools of control and credit allocation in the command and control communist system that developed in the Soviet Union after 1917, and was then imposed on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after World War II. These countries began privatizing after winning their independence in 1989, but they have had insufficient time to completely divest their holdings.
Third, countries with French civil law commercial codes have generally higher state ownership than those with German law, Scandinavian law or English common law codes. This difference was vastly more pronounced before 1990, however, when the core French civil law states in Western Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium) all had banking sectors that were dominated by state ownership.
Beginning with France in 1986-87, however, all these countries launched massive privatization drives that peaked during the 1990s, and now very few banks remain in state hands in any of these countries.
This observation, that the western countries most wedded to state ownership historically have almost completely privatized their banking sectors, brings up the natural question: Why did the most enthusiastic supporters of state-owned banking decide to divest their ownership, and why did other less enthusiastic countries also launch significant banking privatization programs during the past two decades?
Why Have Governments Launched Bank Privatization Programs?
As discussed briefly above, large segments of the global banking system have been transferred from state to private hands over the past two decades, and much more is poised to be sold in the near future-particularly in the emerging powerhouses of India and China. What has caused this fundamental reassessment of state ownership of banking? Two factors stand out as especially important. First, compelling and overwhelming evidence began to accumulate showing that state ownership was not working as planned. The second factor was a dawning realization that this really mattered-that financial system development promoted economic growth. We look at each influence below.
The Theoretical Case against State Ownership of Banks
Economists have offered three principal reasons why state ownership will be inherently less efficient than private ownership, even under the assumption of a benevolent government owner. First, 5 SOE managers will have weaker and/or more adverse incentives than will managers of privately owned firms, and thus will be less diligent in maximizing revenues and (especially) minimizing costs. Second, state enterprises will be subject to less intense monitoring by owners, both because of collective action problems--potential monitors have less incentive to carefully observe managerial performance because they bear all the costs of doing so but reap only a fraction of the rewards--and because there are few effective methods of effectively disciplining SOE managers in the event that sub-par performance is detected. Third, the politicians who oversee SOE operations cannot credibly commit to bankrupting poorly performing SOEs, or even to withholding additional subsidized funding, so state enterprises inevitably face soft budget constraints. It bears repeating that these criticisms of state ownership are valid even if one grants that the politicians who create and supervise public enterprises have benevolent intentions.
The final, and in many ways most compelling, critique of state ownership is that SOEs will be inefficient by design, since they are created specifically so that politicians can use them to benefit their own supporters at the expense of another group in society. Numerous researchers-including Jones (1985) , Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991) , Stiglitz (1993) , Nellis (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1994) , Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996a,b) , Shleifer (1998) , Sappington and Sidak (1999) and Shirley and Walsh (2000) --note that state enterprises can be remarkably effective tools of redistributive politics. Since state firms answer to political masters, rather than the market, wide divergences from profit-maximizing behavior are not only possible, they are in fact desired. Even in fully competitive markets, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that SOEs will be inefficient because politicians force them to pursue non-economic objectives, such as maintaining excess employment, building factories in politically (but not economically) desirable locations, and pricing outputs at below market clearing prices.
The Empirical Evidence on State Ownership of Commercial Banks
In his survey of the empirical evidence on state ownership of non-financial enterprises, Megginson (2004) asks, "Given the large number of empirical studies produced during the last fifteen years, has empirical research generated a conclusive answer regarding the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership?" He concludes that, "fairly clearly, it has, and the answer is that private ownership must be considered superior to state ownership in all but the most narrowly defined fields or under very special circumstances. The empirical evidence clearly supports this conclusion-see, in particular, Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) Does the evidence regarding state ownership of banking point to a similar conclusion? Table 2 details the empirical evidence on state versus private ownership of banking, and the overall picture that emerges is extremely damaging for proponents of government ownership. One of the first studies is Bhattacharya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) , who employ data envelope analysis to examine the relative efficiency of 70 state-, foreign-and privately-owned banks in India during the early stages (1986-1991) of liberalization. Prior to 1970, only one bank in India was state-owned, but a wave of nationalizations in that year and in 1980 created a banking system that was dominated by government-owned institutions.
They find that, during the study period, publicly-owned banks are the most efficient and privately-owned banks the least efficient at delivering financial services to customers. However, their most striking finding is that foreign-owned banks increase market share significantly during this period, primarily at the expense of state banks. These results are rather surprising, since studies of the relative efficiency of stateowned, mixed and privately-owned non-financial enterprises in India show diametrically opposite results.
1 **** Insert Table 2 about here **** LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2002) examine the importance and impact of state ownership in this key industry. Using data from 92 countries, they examine whether government ownership of banks impacts the level of financial system development, rate of economic growth, and growth rate of productivity. They test whether government ownership of banks is motivated by benevolent, "development" objectives or by redistributive "political" objectives. They find that government ownership is extensive, especially in the poorest countries. They also find that these holdings retard financial system development and restrict economic growth rates, mostly due to the impact of state ownership-and the monopoly power frequently attendant thereto--on productivity. and 1998, state banks' performance deteriorates more than did that of private banks and performance differences are most acute in those countries where government involvement in the banking system is the greatest. Economic growth is also slower in these countries, and there is less financial development.
In sum, the weight of empirical evidence now clearly suggests that state ownership of commercial banks yields few benefits, yet is associated with many negative economic outcomes. Whatever the motivations once were for launching state-owned banks, this experiment in state planning must now be considered a systemic failure, and this conclusion helps explain why so many governments have launched large-scale bank privatization programs. We are thus almost ready to analyze how governments privatize, and to assess which specific institutions are selected for divestment. Before doing so, however, we should briefly examine the role state-owned banks play in the problem of soft budget constraints for current or former SOEs.
State-Owned Banks and Soft Budget Constraints: Theory and Evidence
If the managers of a private firm are not operating efficiently, they will be replaced either by the current shareholders or as the result of a hostile takeover. If a private firm cannot compete effectively, suppliers of capital will cease funding the company's operations--and in the extreme the firm will be forced into bankruptcy and liquidated. What are the equivalent public sector disciplinary tools? Empirical evidence suggests that SOE managers are rarely punished individually for poor performance, but what about withholding of capital resources? In real life, the state is unlikely to allow a large SOE to face bankruptcy, thus the discipline enforced on private firms by the capital markets and the threat of financial distress is lacking for state-owned firms. Since managers of less-prosperous state firms know they can rely on the government for funding, these firms are said to face "soft" budget constraints.
Kornai (1988, 1993, 1998) , Berglof and Roland (1998 ), Lin, Cai and Li (1998 ), Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000 and several other authors all suggest that soft budget constraints (SBCs)
were a major source of inefficiency in Communist firms, and that these SBCs have continued through much of the post-communist transition period. Soft budget constraints are not limited to transition economies, however. Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999) Much of the empirical evidence on soft budget constraints examines whether it is in fact possible to impose hard budgets constraints on loss-making SOEs and, if so, whether this improves corporate performance. Numerous articles examine whether soft budget constraints are a problem in transition countries. However, in this section we discuss only those studies that employ either multi-national samples or particularly extensive single-country samples and are thus most generalizeable. These studies are summarized in Table 3 . A complete listing and analysis of all studies of SBCs is presented in chapters 2 and 5 of Megginson (2004) . Table 3 about here ****
**** Insert
A very important study of the effects of SBCs in transition economies is Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000), who examine whether the imposition of hard budget constraints is alone sufficient to improve corporate performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They employ a sample of 216 firms, split between state-owned (31%), privatized (43%), and private (26%) firms, and find that privatization alone adds nearly 10 percentage points to the revenue growth of a firm sold to outside owners. Most important, they find that the threat of hard budget constraints for poorly performing SOEs falters, since governments are unwilling to allow these firms to fail. The brunt of SOEs' lower creditworthiness falls on state creditors.
Bertero and Rondi (2000) employ a sample of 150 Italian manufacturing SOES, with 1,278 firmyear observations, to examine whether imposition of a hard budget constraint can improve SOE performance. They exploit the fact that the fiscal environment became much tighter for Italian state enterprises during the late 1980s, as budget deficits became larger and the public debt reached unsustainable levels. They find that the SOE firms' responses to increased debt during the hard budget constraint period, 1988-93, is consistent with financial pressure, but is not during the soft budget constraint period of 1977-87. Only during the later period do firms respond to financial pressure by increasing total factor productivity and reducing employment. In other words, when hard budget constraints can be credibly imposed on SOEs, they do promote greater efficiency even in the absence of ownership changes.
Lizal and Svejnar (2001) and "loot" their companies. Looting occurs when firms face a soft budget constraint and managers are able to borrow heavily, extract funds from the firm, and then default on the debt without penalty. They employ a dataset with 1,017 observations from 392 companies spread nearly evenly between 1994 and 1996. Half of the firms are voucher-privatized joint stock companies (JSCs) while half are limited liability companies (LLCs). Banks often played key roles as sponsors and/or managers of these investment funds.
Controlling for size, industry, capital intensity and initial leverage, they find that voucher-privatized JSCs perform significantly worse than firms with concentrated ownership that had to be purchased for cash.
Investment fund-controlled JSCs under-perform all other firms, including other JSCs, while fundcontrolled JSCs also took on liabilities at a much faster rate than other firms, indicating they were operating under a soft budget constraint. Though not able to measure the activity directly, they conclude that the evidence indirectly shows that looting was a widespread occurrence for many JSCs.
Evidence on the Importance of Financial System Development in Promoting Economic Growth
In addition to dissatisfaction with the observed performance of state-owned banks, governments have one additional and powerful reason to discard any financial sector development model that is shown to be flawed. There is now little doubt that the financial sector in general, and banking in particular, plays an important role in fostering the economic development of a nation. Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide evidence supporting the positive influence of financial development on economic growth by means of reducing the cost of external financing to firms. They find that financial development is especially important for the process of creating new firms in an economy.
Levine and Zervos (1998) also provide evidence suggesting that banking efficiency is critically important to the development of an economy and that banking services are different from those provided by stock markets. In fact, an entire stream of research has now emerged documenting the critical importance of an efficient financial system to sustainable economic growth. Important recent papers in this literature are Demirgüς-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998) , Levine (1997) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), Wurgler (2000) , Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) . Related papers stress the importance of creating the proper legal and regulatory framework for encouraging the development of efficient, liquid banking and capital markets. This literature is largely encompassed in a series of articles by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) and La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997 , 1998 , 2002 .
The basic themes that emerge from these research streams are that an efficient financial system is vital, and that it is very difficult to construct such a system from scratch or in place of existing (typically less effective) systems, due to the determined opposition from entrenched parties. The most important source of opposition to development of a modern, non-politicized financial system is usually the state--and those with close ties to the existing power structure. This fact makes banking privatization at least as important as a tool of political economy as it is as a mechanism for banking reform.
How do Governments Select Banks to be Privatized?
Two studies examine the determinants of privatization choice-or which banks governments will choose to sell and under what conditions. Clarke and Cull (2002) examine the political economy of sales of thirteen banks by Argentine provincial governments after the passage of the April 1991 Convertibility Act. They find that (1) poorly performing banks are more likely to be privatized than those performing well; (2) overstaffing tends to reduce the probability of privatization because the post-sale staff cuts needed will be too politically painful; (3) larger banks are less likely than smaller banks to be privatized; (4) higher levels of provincial unemployment and higher shares of public employees reduces the likelihood of privatization; and (5) the onset of the Tequila Crisis in 1995 increased the likelihood of privatization by raising the financial costs of continued state bank subsidization. In other words, both economic and political factors impact the privatization decision for individual banks, but political buyoffs seemed especially important factors.
Boehmer, Nash and Netter (2003) use their comprehensive sample of bank privatizations from 51 countries to examine how political, institutional and economic factors relate to a country's decision to privatize its state owned banks. They specifically examine whether the determinants of banks privatization are the same in OECD and non-OECD countries. They find that, in non-OECD economies, bank privatization is more likely the lower the quality of the nation's banking sector, the more right-wing the government is, and the more accountable the government is to its people. None of these factors is significant in developed economies; instead poor fiscal conditions are the most important determinants of bank privatizations in OECD countries.
How do Governments Privatize State-Owned Banks?
The problems inherent in a state-owned banking industry have led many countries to at least consider privatizing state-owned banks. Wherever and however banks are privatized, they all face a common set of concerns and issues. These include: (1) the type of privatization process to utilize: asset sale, public share offering or, in transition economies, vouchers [also known as mass privatization]; (2) whether and how to break up the government-owned banking systems, especially the monobank systems of the former socialist transition economies; (3) dealing with an extremely low-quality loan portfolio, much of which is in default--albeit likely to be unrecognized on a financial reporting basis; (4) ensuring an enhanced level of managerial talent in the system, and (5) ultimately attracting outside (often foreign) capital and expertise to the banking system. We examine the choice of privatization method below, and then discuss the other issues governments face in subsequent sections.
Methods of Privatization
Governments usually choose one of three techniques to privatize: Asset sales, share-issue privatizations, or voucher privatizations. With an asset sale, the government sells ownership of the stateowned enterprise (SOE) to an existing private firm or to a small group of investors. This is similar to the traditional use of the private capital market in non-SOE transactions. The government may sell a fraction or all of the SOE through an asset sale. Typically, these asset sales are implemented through an auction, although governments sometimes sell SOEs directly to private investors. Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) and La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) describe a very important national privatization program (Mexico) that relied almost exclusively on asset sales, and Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarippa (1995), Unal and Navarro
13
(1997), Gruben and McComb (1999) and Haber and Kantor (2003) show that Mexico's banks were all privatized using auctions (a form of asset sale) during the early 1990s.
In share-issue privatizations (SIPs), the privatizing government sells equity shares in the public capital market both to retail and institutional investors. SIPs are the largest and most economically significant of all privatizations, and account for the preponderance of the value of assets privatized outside the formerly communist countries. Jones et al. (1999) report that through 1997, governments in 59 countries raised over $446 billion through 630 SIP transactions. Bank privatizations in OECD countries, and the very largest sales in developing countries, tend to be SIPs. For example, all of the privatizations studied by Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (1999) and Otchere (2003) are SIPs.
Formerly communist Eastern European nations such as Russia, Poland, and the Czech Republic have primarily used voucher privatizations. Voucher privatizations are similar to SIPs, in that shares of ownership are distributed broadly. However, in this method of privatization, the government distributes vouchers (paper claims that are exchanged for ownership in previously state-owned firms) to each citizen.
These vouchers are usually free or very low in price and are available to most citizens. Thus, voucher privatizations result in assets virtually being given to citizens. In a sense, they are SIPs offered at a very low price.
The Record of Bank Privatizations
The empirical record suggests that no one form of sale is the "standard" or default method of Table 4. 14 **** Insert Table 4 about here ****
Empirical Evidence on Banking Privatizations in Developed Countries
Unlike privatizations of non-financial firms, where a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature has emerged, relatively few empirical analyses of bank privatizations have been generated, and most of these have appeared only very recently. This is somewhat surprising since banks, or least the banking function, is indispensable in all economies. At the same time, it is not unexpected since data on banks that have been privatized are so difficult to obtain, especially regarding financial performance before and after privatization. Furthermore, banks have always been one of the favorite tools that politicians and governments employ to channel funding to chosen sectors, industries and firms on favorable terms. As such, they are even more opaque than usual for an industry that under the best of circumstances suffers from lack of transparency in financial reporting.
Nonetheless, over two-dozen empirical studies of bank privatizations have been generated since 1997, and we survey these studies in this and the following two sections. This section discusses empirical studies of bank privatizations in developed countries (defined as countries that were OECD members in 1990), while section 5 surveys studies of privatizations in non-transition developing countries and section 6 discusses empirical analyses of bank divestments in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Four studies examine the effectiveness of bank privatization in OECD countries, and these are summarized in Table 5 . Two of these are multi-national studies, while the other two examine the experience of individual countries. Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (1999, hereafter VMO) They find that (1) the stock prices of major rival banks react negatively to CBA's sales, with especially negative reactions to the initial and final sales; (2) CBA's long-run stock price performance is significantly positive, and increases steadily as the government's ownership stake declines; (3) the financial and operating performance of CBA improves significantly after privatization, and surpasses that of its major rivals.
In sum, the evidence from developed countries is that bank privatization yields significant performance improvements, though these seem to be smaller and less pervasive than the improvements typically documented in studies of non-financial company privatizations in OECD countries. We now assess the privatization experiences of non-OECD countries.
Empirical Evidence on Banking Privatizations in Non-Transition, Developing Countries
Several papers describe bank privatizations in non-transition developing countries, though only three of these actually perform empirical analyses of privatization's impact. These three are summarized in table 6. Two of these are multi-national studies, while the third examines the national experience of Nigeria. Boubakri, Cosset, Fischer and Guedhami (2003) examine the post-privatization performance of 81 banks divested in whole or (much more frequently) in part by governments of 22 developing countries over the period 1986-1998. They find that (1) privatization alone does not seem to significantly impact profitability or operating efficiency; (2) ownership type and industry concentration significantly impacts risk taking behavior by privatized banks, with banks controlled by industrial groups taking the highest risk exposure, followed by locally controlled banks and with foreign owned banks taking the least exposure; (3) foreign owned banks have lower net interest margins than do locally owned banks, suggesting that foreign ownership makes a significantly greater contributions to a divested bank's economic efficiency.
**** Insert Table 6 about here ****
The second multi-national study, Otchere (2003) , performs a similar pre-versus postprivatization analysis of operating performance changes, as well as an assessment of stock price performance, for 21 banks privatizations (18 unseasoned and three seasoned offerings) in low and middle income countries from 1989 to 1997. He also computes the same measures for 28 rival firms for comparison purposes. He finds that privatization announcements elicit significantly negative stock price reactions from rival banks, which are more negative the larger the state ownership fraction that is divested.
These findings support the "competitive effects" hypothesis and suggest that investors view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival banks. On the other hand, Otchere finds that the privatized bank stocks significantly under-perform their respective stock markets, and these returns are also (insignificantly) lower than those achieved by rival bank stocks. He also finds little evidence of significant improvements in the operating performance of privatized banks.
The third empirical study, Beck, Cull and Jerome (2003) , examines the effect of privatization on performance using an unbalanced panel of 69 banks with annual data for the period 1990-2001. The authors focus on the nine banks that were completely privatized during this period. They document a significantly positive impact from privatization, even in a macroeconomic and regulatory environment inhospitable to financial intermediation. Privatization helps close the very wide gap between the performance of state-owned banks and private banks in Nigeria, though the performance of divested firms never surpasses that of private banks.
In addition to these three empirical papers, several studies provide either descriptive analyses of bank privatization programs in developing countries or analyses of the pricing of bank sales, particularly in Latin America. Clarke and Cull (2003) develop a simple theory that models the inherent tradeoffs between (1) sales price offered, (2) layoffs allowed and (3) loan portfolios guaranteed faced by governments and potential buyers in bank privatization transactions. They then test this model using data drawn from 15 provincial Argentine bank privatizations during the 1990s. They find that provinces with high fiscal deficits were willing to accept layoffs and to guarantee a larger fraction of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price. The Tequila Crisis also forced politicians to protect fewer jobs and retain a higher share of the public banks' assets in the "bad bank" residual entity.
Baer and Nazmi (2000) describe the origins of Brazil's state and private banks and examine how the decades of inflation produced distortions in how they functioned. They then describe how the Real Plan's success in halting inflation--which was good for the overall economy-severely impacted the profitability (even the viability) of both state and private banks in Brazil and led the state and national governments to take increasingly desperate steps to rescue the banking system from collapse. Ness (2000) and Makler (2000) present similar discussions of the Brazilian banking system's evolution and outlook.
Brock ( All in all, the empirical record on bank privatization in non-transition developing countries does not offer overwhelming support for the idea that privatization alone can improve the (usually dreadful)
financial and operating performance of state-owned banks. Simply selling off state banks seems to yield only negligible improvement, and poorly designed privatizations (i.e., Mexico's) can backfire badly. On the other hand, empirical evidence also shows that leaving banks under public ownership is an even worse strategy, given the state's dismal fiduciary record. We now conclude our assessment of bank privatization's empirical record by examining how these sales have worked in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Empirical Evidence on Banking Privatizations in Transition Countries
Bank privatizations in the CEE and FSU economies differ significantly from bank sales elsewhere in two important respects. First, these sales involved a transformation from a socialist command economy, in which banks played a central coordinating and credit-rationing mode, to a market economy in which banks are expected to have vastly different functions. Second, many banks were sold through voucher privatizations. Ensuring a smooth shift from state-owned banks to private banks is difficult even in mixed capitalistic systems where only a few sectors may have been nationalized.
Engineering smooth shifts in the banking sectors of economies that are virtually completely state-owned (transition economics) is far more difficult.
A number of theoretical and empirical papers outline the special difficulties encountered by banks in transition economies. Perotti (1993) shows theoretically that banks in these countries have a strong, perverse incentive to fund large former debtors, although these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less efficient and more risky than private firms, because by doing so they gain the potential repayment of previous debts. This inevitably leads to lower productivity of investment and a greater concentration of risk. Furthermore, since privately owned banks feel this incentive just as strongly as state-owned ones, merely privatizing the banking industry will not solve the problem. The incentive to subsidize former debtors is, however, magnified in the all-too-frequent case where the state retains significant influence over the banks or the debtor companies (or both) after these are nominally privatized. Perotti concludes that liquidation of economically hopeless SOEs will generally be preferable to eternal subsidization, since 19 this will both recognize the true value of the debt and remove the "debt overhang" from banks so they can increase their lending to the more dynamic private sector. Saunders and Sommariva (1993) analyze the difficulties of transitioning from state control to a market system with specific reference to Eastern Europe. They investigate alternative approaches for restructuring troubled commercial banks. Beginning with a pure bankruptcy approach, which they reject as a viable alternative, they address various restructuring approaches including recapitalization, "loan hospitals" (bad bank approach), and various types of debt-for-debt and equity-for-debt exchange. They also discuss the use of some of the approaches used in other countries, like the RTC for the savings and loan debacle in the United States. Their analysis demonstrates clearly the difficulty of managing and dealing with only one problem in the bank privatization process, namely the troubled loan issue in the monobank systems. Bonin and Wachtel (1998) provide an excellent analysis of the difficulties of achieving marketbased banking systems in transition economies. They emphasize that bank privatization is only one step in the always painful process of disengaging the state from virtually complete control over the banking system. In a later study, Bonin and Wachtel (2002) , these same authors examine the structure of the banking sectors of six transition countries in which privatization of state-owned banks is well advanced.
Their most striking finding is that foreign banks now dominate banking in Hungary, Poland, the Czech republic, Croatia and Bulgaria-and are making substantial inroads in Romania. The rise of foreign bank ownership is at least partly a result of the essential failure of domestic ownership to satisfactorily address the financial problems of borrowers (especially SOEs) in transition countries or to impose hard budget constraints that would force these firms to restructure. Commander, Dutz and Stern (1999) show that this failure to restructure had an especially woeful impact on the post-privatization performance of firms in all transition economies, but particularly the former Soviet republics. Meyendorff and Snyder (1997) study the "transactional structures" of banking privatizations in Central and Eastern Europe, which they define as having three elements: (1) antecedent actions that determine the characteristics of the unit being privatized; (2) ownership transfer and governance after privatization; and (3) follow-on actions and ongoing government intervention. They note that most of the governments in the region made similar policy choices when they began privatizing their banking systems, which have proven highly influential over time. As examples, most governments chose not to seriously break up the socialist monobank system, and most severely restricted new competition-particularly from foreign banks. For these reasons, the former monobanks retain dominant market shares in most of the transition economies almost a decade after reforms were initiated. Further, none of the politically feasible ownership transfer methods (voucher privatization, insider sales) brought in new capital or talent, so all 20 the region's banking systems remain weak and noncompetitive. The prospect of EU membership in the foreseeable future does, however, offer some hope that true restructuring might begin soon.
The same special issue of the Journal of Comparative Economics in which Meyendorff and
Snyder's paper appears also presents three case studies of specific bank privatizations in transition economies. Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) study the 1993 privatization of Poland's Bank Slaski in a mixed asset sale (to ING) and public offering. They suggest that this experience show the benefits of attracting a strategic foreign investor, but also highlights the costs of pursuing this strategy too obsessively.
Abarbanell and Meyendorff (1997) describe Russia's disbanding of Zhilotsotsbank and the subsequent creation of its private successor, Mosbusinessbank, in a way that left incumbent mangers largely in control of the bank's strategy and operations. They describe how the Russian government's bank privatization and deregulation policies have engendered a system that is 75 percent private and surprisingly innovative-but also highly unstable. Finally, Snyder and Kormendi (1997) describe the 1992 voucher privatization of Komercni Banka, the Czech Republic's largest bank, in a way that left the state in effective control of the company's operating and lending policies. These authors show that this decision to pass up an opportunity to create a strong private bank and to harden budget constraints for borrowers was to have lasting, negative consequences for the bank and the nation.
In sum, the evidence from transition economies is somewhat more favorable regarding the impact of privatization on bank performance than was the case for non-transition developing countries. The natural temptation for governments in all the transition economies was to retain effective control of banks after other non-financial firms had been divested in order to lessen the shock of transition by propping up borrowers with easy credits. This is exactly what the state overseers did in virtually all cases where they retained control (or even influence), and the results were invariably disastrous for the banks, the government and the nation's taxpayers. After repeated "one-time" re-capitalizations, governments throughout the region finally ceded control entirely to private owners, who more often than not were foreign. By 2002, foreign banks controlled the banking system of the largest CEE economies, though they have not yet had the same impact in FSU countries.
Lessons Learned from Studies of Bank Privatization-and Unresolved Issues
The body of evidence discussed above allows us to draw conclusions, but also leaves several issues unresolved. One key item is the fact that many bank privatization programs result in virtually complete foreign ownership of banking systems, particularly in developing and transition economies. We 21 begin this concluding section with a systematic assessment of the evidence regarding the efficacy of foreign ownership of banking assets.
Empirical Evidence on the Impact and Efficiency of Foreign Ownership of Banks
It is not much of an exaggeration to state that the expected final outcome of bank privatizationsespecially flawed privatizations-in developing countries is foreign ownership and control of a nation's banking system. Several studies examine the impact of foreign ownership of banks, and these studies are summarized in Table 7 . Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) examine the extent of foreign ownership in 80 national markets over the 1988-1995 period, and test whether net interest margins, operating costs, taxes paid, and profitability are different between domestic and foreign-owned banks.
They find that foreign banks achieve higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but exactly the opposite is observed in developed markets. Regression analysis also suggest that an increase in foreign bank share leads to lower profitability for domestic banks.
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001) use survey data from over 4,000 borrowers in 38 developing and transition countries during 1999 to examine whether foreign bank penetration reduces access to credit in developing countries. Their empirical results strongly support the assertion that foreign bank penetration improves firms' access to credit. Borrowers in countries with high levels of foreign bank penetration tend to rate access to long-term loans and interest rates as lesser constraints on enterprise operations and growth than enterprises in countries with foreign penetration. The authors also find that the benefits of enhanced credit availability apply to small and medium sized businesses as well as large ones.
Majnoni, Shankar and Várheggi (2003) study the dynamics of foreign bank ownership in Hungary using a sample of 26 commercial banks active in the period 1994 to 2000. By the end of the year 2000, foreign controlled banks account for over two-thirds of total banking assets in Hungary. They find that, after controlling for the nature of investment (greenfield versus acquisition), management style and duration of ownership, foreign banks are pursuing a lending policy that does not differ significantly from domestic banks. Foreign banks are, however, able to achieve consistently higher profitability levels.
In addition to the empirical studies discussed above, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez Hungary in 1999. In sum, the evidence clearly suggests that foreign bank ownership is efficiency enhancing-at least in developing countries-and may well be the default outcome for many national bank privatization programs.
Summary and Conclusions
Bank privatizations are among the biggest challenges facing many governments around the world.
The reluctance of states to remove themselves from the banking and credit systems is well documented, and the overall impact of state ownership on banking has been disastrous in almost every country where government ownership of banks has been pervasive. However, if the objective of a country is to establish a more efficient and market-oriented economy, reducing the influence of the state on credit allocation decisions is critically important.
The studies surveyed in this paper lead us to conclude that there are a series of very important issues and questions that must be addressed in order for bank privatization to be successful. Some, if not most, of these issues do not come into the equation in non-financial privatizations. For bank privatization to be successful in any country, a set of conditions must be achieved that ensure the greatest likelihood for the establishment of a viable banking system. We suggest that the following conditions represent the minimum conditions for achieving this goal.
• A bank regulatory system must be developed that is sufficiently independent from political influence. This is essential for effective bank examination, supervision and monitoring.
• Financial reporting systems must be developed that allow for transparency, especially with regard to asset quality and true profitability.
• Effective methods of dealing with bad loans prior to and/or during the privatization process are essential. This problem is especially severe in situations where uncollectable loans are outstanding to state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
• It is essential to eliminate the culture and propensity of banks to lend to these SOEs after privatization is critical, especially in economies with large remaining concentrations of SOEs, and in transition economies
• There must be assurances that if the government does retain partial ownership, it acts only as a passive investor. This is essential to prevent the continuation of past credit-allocation decisions made by the government, usually on some political or central-planning basis.
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• Finally, and perhaps most controversially, governments may well need to emphasize sales to foreign owners-particularly foreign commercial banks-in order to attract badly-needed capital, expertise, technology, and financial legitimacy.
Table 2: Summary of Empirical Studies on State versus Private Ownership of Banking -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Study
Sample description, study period, and methodology Summary of empirical findings and conclusions Bhattacharya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) Employ data envelope analysis to examine the relative efficiency of 70 state-, foreign-and privately-owned banks in India during the early stages (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) of liberalization.
Find that, during the study period, publicly-owned banks are the most efficient and privately-owned banks the least efficient at delivering financial services to customers. However, they also find that foreign-owned banks increase market share significantly during this period, primarily at the expense of state banks. LaPorta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer (2002) Using data from 92 countries, they examine whether government ownership of banks impacts the level of financial system development, rate of economic growth, and growth rate of productivity. They test whether government ownership of banks is motivated by benevolent, "development" objectives or by redistributive "political" objectives They find that government ownership is extensive, especially in the poorest countries. They also find that these holdings retard financial system development and restrict economic growth rates, mostly due to the impact of state ownership-and the monopoly power frequently attendant thereto--on productivity. Higher government ownership in 1970 is associated with significantly slower subsequent financial development and lower growth in per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports the political view of state ownership of banks. Bonin, Hasan and Paul Wachtel (2002) Examine the impact of ownership structure (state, private and foreign ownership) on bank performance in the six transition economies of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Their sample has 222 observations with financial and ownership data from these six countries for the years 1999 and 2000.
The authors find robust evidence that profitability-measured by return on assets and return on equity--is higher for fully private banks than for banks with some state ownership, and is the highest of all for wholly foreign-owned banks. Foreign banks also experience the most rapid increase in customer loans. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) Use a new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. They also examine the relationship between state ownership and these measures of banking-sector development.
They find that government ownership of banks is negatively correlated with favorable banking outcomes and positively linked with corruption. However, government ownership does not retain an independent, robust association with bank development, efficiency or stability when other features of the regulatory and supervisory environment are controlled for. Sapienza (2003) Studies the effects of government ownership on bank lending behavior using information on individual loan contracts between Italian banks and customers over the period 1991 to 1995. He employs a matched set of 110,786 company-bank-year observations of lines of Finds that borrowers from state-owned banks pay an average of 44 basis points less than do borrowers from private banks. He also shows that the voting pattern of the region where the loan is booked and the party of the state bank's CEO significantly influence the price of loans. These results strongly support the political view of state bank ownership over the competing social and agency cost views.
32 credit extended to 6,968 companies. 55,393 observations refer to borrowers from state-owned banks and 55,393 refer to borrowers from privately owned banks. Cornette, Guo, Khaksari and Tehranian (2003) Examine performance differences between privatelyowned and state-owned banks in sixteen Far East countries from 1989 through 1998. They find that state-owned banks are significantly less profitable than privately owned banks due to state banks' lower capital ratios, greater credit risk, lower liquidity and lower management efficiency. While the performance of all banks deteriorated significantly at the beginning of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998, state banks' performance deteriorated more than did that of private banks and performance differences are most acute in those countries where government involvement in the banking system is the greatest. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Examines whether the imposition of hard budget constraints is alone sufficient to improve corporate performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Employs a sample of 216 firms, split between state-owned (31%), privatized (43%), and private (26%) firms.
Finds privatization alone added nearly 10 percentage points to the revenue growth of a firm sold to outside owners. Most important, finds that the threat of hard budget constraints for poorly performing SOEs falters, since governments are unwilling to allow these firms to fail. The brunt of SOEs' lower creditworthiness falls on state creditors. Privatization required to improve performance; threat of HBC not credible. Bertero and Rondi (2000) Employing a sample of 150 Italian manufacturing SOES, with 1,278 firm-year observations, examine whether imposition of a hard budget constraint can improve SOE performance. Exploits the fact that fiscal environment became much tighter for Italian state enterprises during the late 1980s.
Find that the SOE firms' response to increased debt during the ard budget constraint period, 1988-93, was consistent with financial pressure, but was not during the soft budget constraint period of 1977-87. Only during the later period do firms respond to financial pressure by increasing TFP and reducing employment. Imposition of HBC improves performance without ownership change. Lizal and Svejnar (2001) Examine strategic restructuring and new investment performance of 4,000 Czech companies during 1992-98. Dataset includes over 83,000 quarterly observations. Develop and test a dynamic model of restructuring and investment, allowing them to examine separable impact of private versus public and domestic versus foreign ownership on restructuring, as well as the importance of access to credit and a soft budget constraint on firm investment Find that (1) foreign owned companies invest the most and (domestically owned) cooperatives the least; (2) private firms do not invest more than state-owned firms; (30 cooperatives and small firms are credit rationed; and (4) SOEs operate under a soft budget constraint Coricelli and Djankov (2001) Identify the presence of soft budget constraints and analyze their impact on enterprise restructuring in Romania during the initial transition period. Employ a simple analytical model and a sample of 4,429 enterprises with data from 1992-95 to test whether hardening budget constraints promotes beneficial restructuring and new investment or whether access to external financing is Find that hard budget constraints (HBCs) do promote passive restructuring, in the form of labor shedding, but not new investment. Active restructuring requires access to external financing. Tightened bank credit can induce HBCs and raise enterprise efficiency in the short-run, but at the cost of curtailing investment. 34 required to promote new investment. Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002) Examine the incentive that managers of voucherprivatized Czech companies have to "tunnel" (strip assets out of companies at the expense of outside shareholders) and "loot" their companies. Looting occurs when firms face a soft budget constraint and managers are able to borrow heavily, extract funds from the firm, and then default on the debt without penalty. Employ a dataset with 1,017 observations from 392 companies spread nearly evenly between 1994-96. Half of the firms were voucher-privatized joint stock companies (JSCs) while half were limited liability companies (LLCs).
Controlling for size, industry, capital intensity and initial leverage, find that voucher-privatized JSCs perform significantly worse than firms with concentrated ownership that had to be purchased for cash. Investment fund-controlled JSCs under-perform all other firms, including other JSCs. Fund-controlled JSCs also took on liabilities at a much faster rate than other firms, indicating they were operating under a soft budget constraint. Though not able to measure directly, evidence indirectly shows that looting was a widespread occurrence for many JSCs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sample description, study period, and methodology Summary of empirical findings and conclusions Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (1999) Study the offering terms and share ownership results for 58 unseasoned (IPOs) and 34 seasoned offerings by 65 banks that were fully or partially privatized from 1981 to 1996. They then compare pre and post-privatization performance changes for 32 banks in OECD countries and five in developing countries. Document moderate performance improvements in OECD countries. Ratios proxying for profitability, fee income (noninterest income as fraction of total), and capital adequacy increase significantly; leverage ratio declines significantly. Document large, ongoing state ownership, and significantly positive initial returns to IPO investors. Gleason, McNulty and Pennathur (2003) Examine the short and long-term stock returns to successful bidding firms that participate in the purchase of a financial service firm being privatized. They study bidders that are US-based or have stock traded in a US market and examine 86 transactions from 1980 through 2002, though most sales occur between 1995 and 1998.
Find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to bidding firm shareholders is positive around the date of the announcement, but that this short-run superior performance is not sustainable over longer periods. While the long-run CARs are (insignificantly) negative, the authors find that bank bidders are able to significantly reduce their systematic risks, relative to the home market, following such acquisitions. Braz (1999) Examines the nationalization of Portugal's private banking system following a military coup in 1974, as well as the "re-privatization" of these same banks after 1990. He describes the (multiple) objectives of the Portuguese government in launching this bank privatization program, and also discusses the primary method of sale (public offer) and offer terms of these divestitures.
Shows that (1) the productive efficiency of privatized banks increased significantly after divestiture, with assets per worker showing an especially large differential increase; (2) privatized banks reduced staff at a significantly more rapid rate than did public banks; and (3) privatized banks experienced significantly more rapid growth in their branch networks than did state banks. Otchere and Chan (2003) Perform a clinical analysis (case study) of the impact that Commonwealth Bank of Australia's (CBA's) privatization had on the bank itself as well as on its domestic rivals. The initial sale of CBA was executed in 1991, and the bank was fully divested in 1996.
Find that (1) the stock prices of major rival banks reacted negatively to CBA's sales, with especially negative reactions to the initial and final sales; (2) CBA's long-run stock price performance is significantly positive, and increases steadily as the government's ownership stake declines; (3) the financial and operating performance of CBA improves significantly after privatization, and surpasses that of its major rivals. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sample description, study period, and methodology Summary of empirical findings and conclusions Boubakri, Cosset, Fischer and Guedhami (2003) Examine the post-privatization performance of 81 banks divested in whole or (much more frequently) in part by governments of 22 developing countries over the period 1986-1998. Find that (1) privatization alone does not seem to significantly impact profitability or operating efficiency; (2) ownership type and industry concentration significantly impacts risk taking behavior by privatized banks, with banks controlled by industrial groups taking the highest risk exposure, followed by locally controlled banks and with foreign owned banks taking the least exposure; and (3) foreign owned banks have lower net interest margins than do locally owned banks. Otchere (2003) Performs a similar pre-versus post-privatization analysis of operating performance changes, as well as an assessment of stock price performance, for 21 banks privatizations (18 unseasoned and three seasoned offerings) in low and middle income countries from 1989 to 1997. He also computes the same measures for 28 rival firms for comparison purposes.
He finds that privatization announcements elicit significantly negative stock price reactions from rival banks, which are more negative the larger the state ownership fraction that is divested. These findings support the "competitive effects" hypothesis and suggest that investors view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival banks. He finds that the privatized bank stocks significantly under-perform their respective stock markets, and these returns are also (insignificantly) lower than those achieved by rival bank stocks Beck, Cull and Jerome (2003) Examines the effect of privatization on performance using an unbalanced panel of 69 banks with annual data for the period 1990-2001. The authors focus on the nine banks that were completely privatized during this period. Dcument a significantly positive impact from privatization, even in a macroeconomic and regulatory environment that was inhospitable to financial intermediation. Privatization helped close the very wide gap between the performance of state-owned banks and private banks in Nigeria, though the performance of divested firms never surpassed that of private banks. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sample description, study period, and methodology Summary of empirical findings and conclusions Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) Examine the extent of foreign ownership in 80 national markets over the 1988-1995 period, and test whether net interest margins, costs, taxes paid, and profitability are different between domestic and foreign-owned banks.
Find that foreign banks achieve higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but exactly the opposite in developed markets. Regression results also suggest that an increase in foreign bank share leads to lower profitability for domestic banks. Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001) Use survey data from over 4,000 borrowers in 38 developing and transition countries during 1999 to examine whether foreign bank penetration reduces access to credit in developing countries.
Their empirical results strongly support the assertion that foreign bank penetration improves firms' access to credit. Borrowers in countries with high levels of foreign bank penetration tend to rate interest rates and access to long-term loans as lesser constraints on enterprise operations and growth than enterprises in countries with foreign penetration. The authors also find that the benefits of enhanced credit availability apply to small and medium sized businesses as well as large ones. Majnoni, Shankar and Várheggi (2003) Study the dynamics of foreign bank ownership in Hungary using a sample of 26 commercial banks active in the period 1994 to 2000. By the end of the year 2000, foreign controlled banks accounted for over two-thirds of total banking assets in Hungary.
Find that, after controlling for the nature of investment (greenfield versus acquisition), management style and duration of ownership, foreign banks are pursuing a lending policy that does not differ significantly from domestic banks. Foreign banks are, however, able to achieve consistently higher profitability levels.
